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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The instant case refutes the distinction between the Bingham and Cobb
cases, stating that the former had correctly stated the law when it held that
expenses must be proximately related to the conservation of property. It
holds that if a lien upon any of petitioner's income-producing property would
result from a tax assessment, attorney's fees paid out in defending such
a claim are proximately related to the conservation of income-producing
property and, consequently, are deductible under § 23(a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
To logically follow this reasoning would be to conclude that the ex-
pense of defending any type of litigation, for example, a tort action, would
be deductible because a judgment rendered against taxpayer would become
a lien on his income-producing property.' 0 However, the law is still clear
that where the transaction which gave rise to the tax assessment was not
proximately related to the production or collection of income, any expense
arising from such litigation would not be deductible." The Lykes case does
not change this rule. It merely broadens the scope of expenses considered
proximately related to include attorney's fees paid for defending a tax
assessment where the assessment might result in a lien on any of petitioner's
income-producing property, even though such property was not the subject
of the transaction which gave rise to the original tax assessment.
INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-REQUIREMENT TO
DEFEND-ATTORNEY'S FEES IN DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Plaintiff, insurance company, brought suit for a declaratory judgment
against its insured under a public liability policy to determine whether it was
required to defend an action against the insured by a third party. Judgment
was rendered for the insured and attorney's fees were adjudged against insurer
under a Florida statute ' which provides that attorney's fees be assessed against
insurer where insured successfully prosecutes suit against the company. On
appeal, held, that attorney's fees were properly awarded insured since the stat-
ute is applicable to situations where suit is brought by insurer as well as insured,
Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Anderson's Groves, Inc., 176 F.2d 246 (5th Cir.
1949).
Where attorney's fees are permitted by statute, cases arising thereunder
10. See John W. Willmot, 2 T.C. 321, 326 (1943).
11. Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 66 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Joseph v. Commis-
sioner, 8 T.C. 583 (1947).
1. FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1941). "Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any
of the courts of this state against any insurer in favor of the beneficiary under any policy
or contract of insurance executed by such insurer, there shall be adjudged or decreed
against such insurer and in favor of the beneficiary named in said policy or contract of
insurance, a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for his attorneys or solicitors prose-
cuting the suit in which recovery is had."
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must be strictly construed within its provisions inasmuch as the imposition of
such fees are in the nature of a penalty.2 The delinquencies and dilatory tactics
practiced by insurance companies in their payment of claims have resulted in
the application of such a penalty to compel the companies to pay their claims
promptly.3 The question as to whether attorney's fees should be granted an in-
sured where the insurer brings an action for a declaratory judgment to deter-
mine its liability, and is unsuccessful, has not heretofore been decided in
Florida. However, the award of attorneys fees under the statute where the
insured brought an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the liability
of the insurance company ' was held proper.
Since statutes awarding attorney's fees are penal in nature and are strictly
construed, it might appear that an insurer who has not refused to pay claims,
but is merely seeking a declaratory judgment in a situation involving legal
uncertainty as to whether he is required to defend the insured, would not be
within the provisions of such a statute. To impose a penalty against the insurer
in such a case would discourage the beneficial use of the declaratory judgment
precedure.5 However, resort to the courts by an insurer on the pretext of
uncertainty of obligation may be used as a dilatory tactic which the statute
was designed to overcome. Since attorney's fees are not adjudged against the
insurer unless he is unsuccessful, such a penalty would not be imposed against
an insurer whose defense under the policy is sound. In the instant case if the
insurer had not brought the declaratory judgment action, but had waited for
the insured to defend an action by the injured party, attorney's fees would have
been assessed against insurer when the insured brought suit against the
company to compel it to comply with the terms of the policy.6 The fact that
the insurer brought the insured into court prior to the time when the
insured might have brought suit against the company, should not work to the
disadvantage of insured by requiring him to bear the cost of a suit brought by
the company.
An insured should be able to rely on the insurance company defending
him. To subject him to the possibility of two suits-by the insurer to deter-
mine his non-liability and by the injured party for negligence-might work an
injustice upon him.7 But, however effective the result of the majority of the
2. Union Indemnity Co. v. Vetter, 40 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1930) ; United States Fire
Insurance Co. v. Dickerson, 82 FIa. 442, 90 So. 613 (1921).
3. Pendas v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 129 Fla. 253, 176 So. 104(1937) ; Orlando Candy Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. of Manchester, 51 F.2d
392 (S.D. Fla. 1931).
4. Continental Casualty Co. v. Giller Concrete Co., 116 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.
1940), cert, denied, 313 U.S. 567 (1940). In a suit for a declaratory udgment, the court in
allowing attorney's fees stated that under the statute a "recovery is had" and insurance
company is liable for attorney's fees whenever it unsuccessfuilly defends an action against
it on a policy or contract of insurance. The statute is not limited to suits for the recovery
of money, but is applicable to suits for declaratory judgments.
5. Hutcheson dissenting in the principal case.
6. Brief for Appellees, p. 38.
7. BORCHARD, DXLARATORY JUDGMENTS 653 (2d ed. 1941).
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court in the principal case may be in discouraging insurance companies from
unnecessarily bringing the insured into court by awarding attorney's fees to
the insured, the statute is clear and unambiguous in stating that its provisions
apply to situations where the insured prosecutes. When a statute, as here, is
clear upon its face, and when standing alone is fairly susceptible of but one
construction, that construction should be accepted. 8 Strict interpretation of the
provisions warrant the conclusion that the court went beyond the express
provisions of the statute to reach a desired result, even though to give the
statute this construction would in effect result in defeating the intention of the
legislators.
LABOR LAW-RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES TO
STRIKE AGAINST A MUNICIPALITY
Plaintiff, Department of Water of the City of Los Angeles, sought
to enjoin defendant labor unions, whose members were employed by inde-
pendent contractors under contract with the city, from striking, picketing
and engaging in other concerted action for the purpose of coercing the
Department to comply with certain demands of defendants regarding work-
ing conditions. A preliminary injunction issued granting the relief sought
and denying the defendants' contention that the strike was not against
the government, as the city was acting in a proprietary rather than a gov-
ernmental capacity. Held, on appeal, that since the city charter did not require
that the Department grant the unions' demands, the strike was illegal in its
purpose, regardless of the peaceful means employed, and the order of the
injunction was affirmed. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building & Construction
Trades Council, 210 P.2d 305 (D.C. App. Cal. 1949).
Courts have long refused to recognize that city officials have a duty
to enter into agreements with labor unions governing the terms of em-
ployment.' Today, most courts go even further in holding that a municipality
8. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175
U.S. 414 (1899).
1. The rights of employees of municipalities to belong to labor unions has not been
uniformly allowed. Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537
(D.C. App. Cal. 1946) (the court upheld an order of the Board forbidding police officers
to become, or to continue to be, members of any labor union) ; accord, C.I.O. v. Dallas, 198
S.W. 2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), McNutt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920). But see Mugford v. Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945) ; Local Union No.
876 Y. Mich. Labor Mediation Board, 294 Mich. 629, 293 N.W. 809 (1940), City ordinances
prescribing union labor on public contracts have usually been held invalid. Adams v.
Brenan, 177 Ill. 194, 52 N.E. 314 (1898). Contra: Amalithone Realty Co. v. New York;
162 Misc. 715, 295 N.Y. Supp. 423 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
